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Economic thought of
an Arab scholastic: Abu Hamid al-Ghazali
(A.H. 450–505/A.D. 1058–1111)
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This paper explores the economic thought of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, an eleventh-century Arab scholar, "acclaimed as the greatest... certainly one of the greatest" (Watt, 60), and "by general consent, the most important thinker of medieval Islam" (Bagley, 6). Ghazali's scholarship extended to many diverse fields of learning. His writings, as those of European scholastics and others of his era, emphasized the "holistic" intellectual approach. While there have been other studies on his works (see, for example, McKane, Quasten, Watt), to the best of our knowledge, none has investigated his contributions to economics, especially on the basis of a detailed scrutiny of his original, Arabic-language writings. The present paper attempts to fill that void.

There are also other, secondary concerns. About twenty-five years ago Joseph Spengler wrote an excellent article on the economic thought of another Arab scholar, Ibn Khaldun (712–809/1312–1406), and while referring to Arab-Islamic literature of the era, he concluded that "the knowledge of economic behavior in some circles was very great indeed, and one must turn to the writings of those with access to this knowledge and experience if one would know the actual state of Muslim economic knowledge." (1964, 56). That indeed is true, for it is possible to identify at least thirty Arab scholars prior to Ibn Khaldun who wrote extensively on economic matters, Ghazali being one of the most prominent. Another scholar writing on Ibn Khaldun called him "among the fathers

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1. The term "scholastic" refers to the philosophical approach followed by Europe's medieval scholastics, concerned with the "parity of reconciling reason and faith" (Dennett, 63). Among the best-known is St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). Mahmoud al-Hashimi (1358–1432) was a prominent Arab-Islamic scholar of the time to whom, according to some, although Ghazali's work on the mystical was heavily influenced by his ideas. However, despite his work on the mystical, al-Hashimi, although known for his work on the mystical, was not identified as an Arab (or Islamic) theologian-scholar.
Palestine, Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt. About 588/1190 he returned to his birthplace, where he lived till his death in 625/1227.

Throughout his student life he studied various subjects, prominent among them being the Islamic sciences. Among his several writings, one widely recognized as the most significant, his four-volume Al-Tabarîn al-Dîn (The revival of the religious sciences), is the major source for discussion below and, incidentally, parallel Aquinas's Summa theologica (see, e.g., Duhem, 990; Sartre, 964).

Consistent with the intellectual tradition of the time, Ghazanfar's scholarship was not dominated by economic aspects of life—true also of other Arab as well as European scholars. Instead one chiefly encounter such texts theological-philosophical rationalization. Treatises on a specific subject would hardly have been compatible with the prevailing “integrative” approach to learning. Like other scholars of his age Ghazanfar mixed philosophical, religious, ethical, sociological, and economic considerations into his writings. More time to time a poem, anecdote, aphorism, or quotation from the Scriptures (Islamic as well as others) enlightens his texts.

III

Of the socioeconomic aspects of his thinking we can only present a bare outline, but from this we can grasp what might be called his “Islamic social welfare function” as well as his views on the role of economic activities generally. An overriding theme throughout his works is the concept of maslahah, or social welfare or utility ("common good"), a concept which encompasses all human affairs, economic and otherwise, and which establishes close links between the individual and society. Indeed one author has suggested that Ghazanfar discovered the hard-and-fast concept of a social welfare function that modern economists long for (Caro, 14). Ghazanfar identified all matters in terms of whether they were maslahah (utilitites) or wasafîf (disutilities) in promoting social welfare. He further defined the welfare function in terms of a hierarchy of individual and social needs.

According to Ghazanfar, the welfare (maslahah) of a society depends upon the pursuit and preservation of five basic goals: (1) religion (Islam); (2) life or soul (nafs); (3) family or progeny (insan); (4) property or wealth (masâl); and (5) intellect or reason (laq). He emphasized that of these divine guidances, “the goodness of this life and the Hereafter (maslahah of deen wa ad-dunya) represents the key objective” (Myer, 2:109).

We discuss the economic aspects of his social welfare function in terms of a tripartite hierarchy of individual and social utilities: necessities (da'if); conveniences or comforts (kainât); and refinements or luxuries (talâfîn) — a classification reminiscent of the Aristotelian
tradition, identified by one scholar as “cultural needs” (basic needs, need for “external” goods, and for psychic goods) (Waley, 226). The key to preservation of these five basic goals lies in the provision of the first level, necessaries, defined as food, clothing, and shelter. However, Ghazali recognizes that such basic needs need to be flexible according to time and place and may include even sociopsychological needs. The second group of needs “comprises all activities and things that are not vital to the five foundations, but, rather, are needed to remove impediments and difficulties in life.” The third group “includes activities and things that go beyond the limits of conscience; it includes matters that complement, brighten or adorn life” (Zaruq, 14).

Although salvation is the ultimate goal, Ghazali would not want that pursuit to be in disregard of one’s mundane obligations. Indeed the pursuit of economic activities is not merely desirable, it is imperative for salvation (Ryu, 2:60). He emphasizes the “middle path” and the “correctness” of one’s intentions in all activities. When intentions are consistent with divine laws, then economic activities are tantamount to worship—part of one’s calling (Ryu, 2:70).

In addition Ghazali considers the development of the economy as part of divinely ordained, socially obligatory duties (fard-e-kifaya); if these were not fulfilled, worldly life would collapse and humanity would perish (Ryu, 3:32). And he insists upon efficiency in such pursuits, for ‘living so as part of fulfilling such religious duties’ (Ryu, 3:236, 2:240, 3:236, Muzaf. 377). Further, he identifies as part of one’s calling three reasons why one must pursue economic activities: (1) self-sufficiency, (2) the well-being of one’s family, and (3) assisting others in need. Anything less would be religiously “blameworthy” (Ryu, 2:69, 2:49).

Ghazali criticizes those who would confine themselves to the acquisition of a mere subsistence level of living: “If people stay confined to a subsistence level (nadd al-retum) and become very frugal, deaths will increase, all work and industry will come to a halt, and society will perish. Further, religion will be destroyed, as the worldly life is the preparation for the Hereafter” (Ryu, 2:126). Then if subsistence living were the norm, human productive effort would suffer, in addition to society’s spiritual loss.

Though Ghazali views people as “maximizers” and acquisitive, he sees nothing religiously condemnable about such tendencies. “Man loves to accumulate wealth and possessions of all kinds of property. If he has two valleys of gold, he would want to have a third” (Ryu, 2:290). Why? Because “man has high aspirations. He always thinks that the wealth which is enough now may not last, or might get ruined and then he would need more. He tries to overcome these fears by further accumulation. But such fears do not end—even if he has all the posses-
sions of the world” (Ryu, 2:346). Clearly Ghazali recognizes not only man’s desire to accumulate wealth but also his need to be prepared for the future. However, he warns that if the acquisitive spirit leads to greed and pursuit of personal wealth, it is condemnable (Ryu, 3:234, 4:101; Muzaf. 296). It is in this sense that he regards wealth as the “greatest test” (Ryu, 3:21, 231).

How do income and wealth come about? Ghazali recognizes three sources: earnings through individual labor, profits from trading, and acquisitions of fortunes. He cites examples of the latter as through inheritance, finding a treasure, or receiving a gift. But he insists that sources of earnings must be religiously lawful and valid.

He is critical of forced equality of income and wealth. To the extent possible, sharing of wealth must be voluntary, as part of one’s divinely ordained moral obligation toward others, rather than through the authority of the state—though conditions may warrant that approach. Indeed, he is a critic many would find surprising that if there were no laws, rulers would force people to surrender what they viewed as beyond that and would become tyrants. Further, he is concerned about the administrative problems of collecting this “surplus” as well as its distribution (Ryu, 3:100). Without voluntary sharing, he argues, two “blaseworthy” results will follow: extravagance by some, and meanness by others. The former leads to “evil deeds, the latter to the hoarding of money or keeping it idle and not spending, which is like the imprisonment of a public authority not allowed to perform its proper functions” (Ryu, 2:341). Incidentally, he has little sympathy for those who, on faith (iman), alone, choose to be poor, or those who, without making efforts, attribute their misfortunes to the “will of God” (Qur. 24:36; Ryu, 4:263).

In a historical context it is useful briefly to point out that Ghazali’s scholarship, insofar as it was done with his deep Islamic faith, assumes its greatest significance in relation to the larger philosophical-theological controversies of the time—between reason and revelation, between faith and skepticism. Extending beyond the inherited reserve of Aristotelian logic, he challenged other Arab-Islamic scholars of his era, such as Ibn Fakhr, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd, whose rationalistic interpretations of Aristotle threatened Islam itself. This challenge and his attempts at a reconciliation appeared in his treatise Buya’ al-Faranf (The Inscrutability of Philosophers).

Subsequently, as the translated works of the Arabic-Islamic Aristotelian rationalists reached medieval Europe, they even threatened the “Rigidity of Christian theology” (Dumayr, 934). Indeed, the list of 219 condemnations ("Avicennian heresies", as they were called) published in 1277 by Etienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris, was a clear manifesta-
tion of those fears (Durant, 957–58). Thus, relying heavily on Ghazali’s works, St. Thomas Aquinas was led to write his Summae to overcome that threat (Durant, 954). And, “Ghazali placed science, philosophy, and reason in positions inferior to religion and theology, the Scholastics acceded his views, which became characteristic of most medieval philosophy” (Myers, 39–40).

IV

With this general perspective on Ghazali’s socioeconomic outlook in mind, we may now identify several specific economic concepts and principles similar to those found in the works of his Arab cohorts, European scholastics, and others. Indeed, many of Ghazali’s ideas are almost identical to those found in contemporary texts.

Much of his discussion on economic matters is found in his Hicayat al-Mann. Some of his other writings are also important sources. From these it becomes possible to pull together several logically coherent, closely interrelated economic themes, under four broad topics: (1) voluntary exchange and the evolution of markets; (2) production activities; (3) money and the evolution of money; and (4) the role of the state and public finance.

1. Voluntary exchange and the evolution of markets

Ghazali provides a surprisingly detailed discussion of the role and significance of voluntary trading activities and the emergence of markets, based on demand and supply forces in determining prices and profits. Indeed, he seems to lay the foundation of what was later called the “spirit of capitalism.”

For Ghazali, markets evolve as part of the “natural order” of things—an expression of self-motivated desires to satisfy mutual economic needs. A full appreciation of the depth and breadth of his insights becomes evident from the following:

Perhaps farmers live where farming tools are not available. Blacksmiths and carpenters live where farming is lacking. So, the farmer needs blacksmiths and carpenters, and they in turn need farmers. Naturally, each will want to satisfy his needs by giving up in exchange a portion of what he possesses. But, it is also possible that when the carpenter wants food in exchange for tools, the farmer does not need the tools. Or, when the farmer needs tools, the carpenter does not need food. So such situations create problems.

Therefore, pressures emerge leading to the creation of trading places where various tools can be sold for exchange and also warehouses where farmers’ produce can be stored. Then, customers come to obtain those goods and markets are established.

Farmsmen bring produce to the markets and if they cannot readily sell or exchange what they possess, they sell them at a lower rate to the traders who in turn store the produce and sell to the buyers as a profit. That is true for all kinds of goods (Myers, 3–27).

He is also explicit on regional trade:

Then, such practices extend to various cities and countries. People travel to different places to obtain tools and food and transport them. People’s economic affairs become organized into cities which may not have all the tools needed and into villages which may not have all the food-stuffs needed. People’s needs and interests necessitate transportation. Then, a class of traders who carry goods from one place to another emerges. The motive behind all these activities is the accumulation of profits. Undoubtedly, these traders exhaust themselves by travelling to satisfy others’ needs and to make profits, and then these profits too are eaten by others when they themselves obtain things from others. (Myers, 3–27)

Ghazali thus clearly suggests the “mutualism” of economic exchange, which necessitates specialization and division of labor with respect to regions and resources. Further, he recognizes that trading activities add value to goods by making them available at a useful place and time. Motivated by participants’ self-interest, exchange leads to the creation of profit-motivated middlemen, or “traders.” Through accumulation of wealth in this manner, he saw it as essential to the proper functioning of a progressive economy. Moreover, while discussing trading activities, he also mentions the need for safe and secure trading routes and remarks that the state should provide protection so that markets can expand and the economy can grow. He showed a strong understanding of the interactions of demand and supply, as well as the role of profits as part of the dividend-collected scheme of things. He even provides a rather well-defined ethical code for the business community.

Demand, supply, prices, and profits. Though Ghazali does not discuss demand and supply in modern terms, numerous paragraphs from his works demonstrate considerable depth in this respect. Throughout he talks in terms of “prevailing price, as determined by market practice,” a concept referred to as “just price” by some of his Arab contemporaries, later to be similarly labeled by the European scholastics, and still later to become “equilibrium price.”

Ghazali is referring to an upward-sloping supply curve when he says that “(if) the farmer does not get a buyer for produce, then he sells it at a very low price” (Myers, 3–27). His awareness of market forces is evident when, concerning high food prices, he suggests that the price should be
induced down by reducing demand, implying a leftward shift in the demand curve (Rosu, 3:87). He also seems to have some insight into the concept of price elasticity of demand: “a cut in profit margin by price reduction will cause an increase in sales and thus in profits” (Al-Asy, 2:800). He likewise recognizes “price-inelastic” demand, for he says that since food is a necessity, trading in food should be minimally motivated by profits, especially when the increase in prices and profit could occur, and that since profits represent an “extra,” they should be, in general, sought from non-necessities (Al-Asy, 2:75).

Like other scholars of his era, Ghazali discusses prices and profits more or less together, without clear reference to costs and revenues. While expressing some disdain, though not condemnation, for profit-seeking, he recognizes the motivations for, as well as sources of, profits. Profits are viewed as the return on risk and uncertainty, as “they [traders and businessmen] bear a lot of trouble in seeking profits and take risks and endanger lives in voyages” (Al-Asy, 4:118).

As indicated above, Ghazali is critical of “excessive” profits. He suggests that if a buyer offers a “high” price, relative to the “prevailing price,” the seller should not accept, for profit will be excessive—although that would not be an injustice if there were no fraud (Rosu, 2:79). He suggests, however, that “normal” profits should be around 5 to 10 percent of the price of a good (Al-Asy, 151). He insists that sellers should be guided by “profits” of the “ultimate” market—i.e., the Hereafter (Rosu, 2:75–76, 84).

Ethis of market behavior. Ghazali visualized the functioning of markets on the basis of an ethical-moral code of conduct on the part of participants. Specifically, he warns against profiteering by hoarding foodstuffs and other necessities. This would be a great injustice, especially in times of scarcity, and must be condemned (Al-Asy, 151).

He considers false advertisement as one of the evils of the market which must be prohibited. He admonishes traders that “they should not give false information about weight, quantity, or the price. Such practice means fraud, which is to be strictly prohibited” (Rosu, 2:73). While unregulated, informative advertisement is acceptable, he says, it is wasteful to point out the obvious qualities of a good. Emphasis on the necessity for truth and honesty in business, he considers practices such as adulteration, deceptive grading or marking, and control of markets by secret dealings and price manipulations (Al-Asy, 2:79).

Thus, according to Ghazali, markets are to function freely and must be free from deception. Indeed the participants’ behavior should reflect benevolence (Al-Asy), meaning “doing something extra for another in transactions beyond the material benefits, though that extra is not an obligation, but merely an act of generosity” (Al-Asy, 2:79). He then enumerates several guidelines concerning the exercise of benevolence in

the marketplace, such as leniency in dealing with the poor, flexibility in debt transactions, even forgiving debt repayment from some poor.

2. Production activities

Ghazali devotes considerable attention to describing various kinds of production activities in a society, including their hierarchy and nature. He classifies production activities in terms of their social importance and emphasizes the need for cooperation and coordination. His primary focus is on the types of activities that are consistent with the underlying Islamic ethos.

Production of necessities a social obligation. We noted above that Ghazali considers economic pursuits as part of the individual’s worship (Rosu, 2:60). Production of necessities is specifically viewed as a socially obligatory duty (Al-Asy, 2:83). If some are engaged in producing such goods in sufficient quantities for society’s needs, then the obligation of all is fulfilled in this respect. However, if no one is pursuing such activities or if insufficient quantities are produced, then all will be held accountable in the Hereafter. In an ultimate sense, the state must assume the responsibility of ensuring that necessities are produced in sufficient quantities. Indeed, Ghazali argues, an imbalance concerning necessities will tend to create socially destructive conditions.

Hierarchy of production. Ghazali suggests a classification of productive activities, quite similar to that found in contemporary discussions of primary (agriculture), secondary (manufacturing), and tertiary (services). He identifies three broad categories (Al-Asy, 3:12, 13, 16; Al-Asy, 328–329):

1. Basic industries: those which sustain human life. There are four subgroups: agriculture for food, textiles for clothing, construction for shelter, and activities of the state (including the provision of infrastructure), particularly for facilitating the production of necessities and for promoting cooperation and coordination among those engaged in production.
2. Ancillary activities: adjuncts to basic industries, such as iron and steel industry, mineral exploration and development, and forest resources.
3. Complementary activities relating to basic industries, such as grinding and baking of agricultural products.

Ghazali recognizes the first group as the most important and suggests that within this group the role of the state, as a mediating force, is rather crucial.

Given this classification, he believes that to ensure proper harmony of the socioeconomic environment, all these groups must be actively promoted and pursued; indeed their fulfillment represents a socially obliga-
tory duty; a "divine duty." And "if people abandon them, human beings could not survive—and it is God's blessing that people have skills for different occupations" (Ihya, 2:13; Mi'yar, 360).

Stages of production, specialization, and linkages. Ghazali is also aware of the various production stages before a product's final consumption. Further, he is conscious of the "linkages" that often exist in the production chain—a notion well recognized in present-day discussions. Then, he says, "the farmer produces grain, the miller converts it into flour, the baker prepares bread from the flour." As to interdependence in production, he says: "Further, the blacksmith makes tools for farmer's cultivation, and the carpenter manufactures tools needed by the blacksmith. The same goes for all those who engage in the production of tools and implements needed for the production of foodstuff" (Ihya, 4:173).

The various production stages and linkages require division of labor as well as coordination and cooperation. Ghazali provides a clear description:

"You should know that the plants and animals cannot be eaten and digested as they are. Each needs some transformation, cleaning, mixing, and cooking, before consumption. For a bread, for example, first the farmer prepares and cultivates the land, then the bullock and tools are needed to plough the land. Then the land is irrigated. It is cleared from weeds, then the crop is harvested and grains are cleaned and separated. Then there is mixing into flour before baking. Just imagine—how many tasks are involved, and we here mention only some. And, imagine the number of people performing these various tasks, and the number of various kinds of tools, made from iron, wood, stone, etc. If one inquires, one will find that perhaps a single loaf of bread takes its final shape with the help of perhaps more than a thousand workers." (Ihya, 4:118)

Ghazali elaborates his argument by using the example of a needle, analogous to Adam Smith's pin-factory example centuries later: "even the small needle becomes useful only after passing through the hands of needle-makers about twenty-five times, each time going through a different process" (Ihya, 4:119). He also offers insights as to specialization and interdependence within a family (Ihya, 2:51, 3:229).

Though he emphasizes cooperation and coordination, Ghazali is conscious of the competitive environment in which economic activities take place: "When people live in a society and their desires for different things develop, there tends to be a struggle in fulfilling those desires. There is competition, but balance can be maintained by the exercise of authority and maintenance of justice" (Ihya, 1:53). He uses the word "competition," in broader terms than its current usage and suggests that competition in general is not to be condemned or prohibited. Rather, he identifies three levels of competition: obligatory, desirable, and permissible. "Obligatory competition pertains to religious duties in pursuit of salvation. Desirable competition relates to the acquisition of necessities and comforts, as well as spending on others' needs. Permissible competition relates to the acquisition of luxuries" (Ihya, 3:290-91). However, he insists, competition must not lead to jealousy and contempt for others.

As an aside, it is interesting to note that Ghazali anticipated Thomas Malthus by several hundred years on the subject of population and how to regulate its growth. He states at least two economic motives for practicing birth control: the burden of a large family, and the possibility that such an excessive burden could force one into illicit means of livelihood. But though birth control (act, or coatus interruptus, is the suggested method) may be acceptable, actions based on such motives "tend to place a person below the rank of praiseworthy and preferable people" (Ihya, 2:52). Clearly, Ghazali was far ahead of his times (see also Spengler 1970).

3. Barter and the evolution of money

Money is perhaps one of the most important inventions in the conduct of economic affairs. Ghazali recognized this and offered a rather sophisticated discourse as to the evolution of money and its various functions. He explains how money overcomes the problems of barter. He discusses the harmful effects of counterfeiting and currency degradation (anticipating similar observations by Nicholas Oresmus during the fourteenth century and by Thomas Gresham, Richard Cantillon, and others much later).

Problems of barter and the need for money. The following passage suggests the depth and rigor of Ghazali's insights on the subject:

Creation of dharms and dinaats [gold and silver coins] is one of the bounties of God. All economic transactions are based on these two kinds of money. They are metals, with no benefits in themselves. However, people need them to exchange things for different things—food, clothing, and other goods. Sometimes a person needs what he does not own and he owns what he does not need. For example, a person has a saffron but needs a camel for transport and one who owns a camel does not presently need one but he wants saffron. However, there must be a measure of the two-objects in exchange, for the camel-owner cannot give the whole camel for a quantity of saffron. There is no similarity between them so that equal amount of that weight and form could be given. These goods have no direct proportionality so one cannot know how much
saffron will equal a camel's worth. Such barter transactions will be very difficult.

Various goods such as these need a medium which could easily and accurately determine their value in exchange. When their place and grades are uncertain, it is impossible to distinguish which ones are equal to each other and which are not. So it is said a camel is, in fact, equal to 100 dinars and this much quantity of saffron is worth 100 dinars. Since each is equal to a given amount of dinars, the two quantities are equal to each other. But those dinars and dinars are not needed for themselves. They are created to change hands and to establish rules for exchange with justice and for buying goods which have usefulness. A thing such as money can be exactly linked to other things if it has no particular form or feature of its own—for example, a mirror has no color but can reflect all colors. (Ivy. 4:91-93)

Ghazali is clearly pointing out here the problems of a barter system that modern jurists would label as (1) lack of a common denominator, (2) indivisibility of goods, and (3) the problem of double coincidence of wants. Although exchange can take place through barter, differences in the characteristics of goods (e.g., camels and saffron) make it inefficient. Indeed, the choice of various examples manifests Ghazali's keen understanding of "barter" problems. He asserts that money evolved in a convention only: no society could exist without the exchange of goods; no exchange could effectively take place without equivalence, and such equivalence is only properly determined when there is a common measure.

It might be noted that Ghazali recognizes not only the fundamental basis of value of a good, i.e., its usefulness or utility, but also its value in exchange. Both concepts—are value and exchange value—became very important in subsequent debates by classical economists and others.

"Useless" money and hoarding against divine rules. As indicated above, Ghazali understood the various functions of money. But he stresses that money is not desired for its own sake: it carries value only in exchange—only when parted with. Moreover, he observes that about the only purpose served by gold and silver is as money—dirhams and dinars. He condemns those who hoarded pieces of money or convert them into other objects:

If someone hoards dinars and dinars, he is a transgressor. Dirhams and dinars are . . . useless by themselves. They are created to circulate from hand to hand, to govern and facilitate exchange . . . [as] symbols to know the value and grades of goods. Anyone who converts them into unëssis of gold and silver is ungrateful to his Creator and worse than the hoarder of money, for such a person is like one who forces the ruler to perform unëssis functions—e.g., weaving cloth, collecting taxes, etc. Hoarding of coins may be preferable to conversions, for there are other metals and materials—copper, bronze, iron, clay—that make moneys. But clay and iron cannot be used for the functions performed by dirhams and dinars. (Ivy. 4:91-93)

Counterfeiting and currency debasement. Historically, gold and silver have been the most important metals used as commodity money. Governments started minting these coins to avoid costly weighings whenever a transaction occurred. Money could be privately produced by simply taking one's mixed gold or silver to the mint. Under a commodity standard of money, a coin's metal content used to be equivalent in value to the coin's value as money. On that basis, if more of a metal was discovered, the supply of money would increase, as would prices, and money would depreciate; the opposite would hold if there was a decrease in the supply of the metals. Such is the simple explanation of inflationary-deflationary cycles under a commodity standard of money.

Ghazali seems to have grasped the rudiments of this cycle theory, though his analysis is not as specific. His concern is primarily with problems that arise from counterfeiting and currency debasement—the mixing of inferior metals with gold or silver coins, or mutilation of the metal's content. He regards counterfeit money as not only an individual sin but, most importantly, potentially harmful to the society generally:

It is a great injustice to place counterfeit money in circulation. All those handling it are harmed . . . circulation of one counterfeit dirham is worse than stealing a thousand dirhams, for the act of stealing is one sin, ending one sin committed; but counterfeit money is something that affects many who use it in transactions for a long time. (Ivy. 2:73)

As to currency debasement, Ghazali says:

By soft jallay, mixed metal we mean that unit of money which contains no silver at all; it is only polished; or dinars with no gold in them. If a coin contains some silver but it is mixed with copper and that in the authorized coin in the country, this is acceptable whether silver content is known or not. But, if it is not authorized, then it will be acceptable only if silver content is known. (Ivy. 2:74)

He seems to suggest that if debasement is fraudulent it is to be condemned, whereas if the mixture of metals in coins is state-authorized and known to all users it is acceptable. Thus he allows for the possibility
(Al-Muhtad, 301–4). Here is an obvious antecedent of what is now referred to as cost-benefit analysis: taxes may be levied to avoid greater loss later.

While discussing taxation, Ghazali also provides insights on other related matters, such as tax administration and apportioning burden among taxpayers. In particular he admonishes that “no ruler should ever tolerate extortion from the subjects by any revenue official...the ruler must look after the society as he would his own house, so society may prosper and grow. What he takes in taxes must be in moderation, and what he gives must be in moderation; for each has its limits and its measure” (Conseil, 88–89).

He also seems aware of both the benefits received and the ability-to-pay principles of taxation, as the terms are used in current literature. He suggests the quid-pro-quo basis of some taxes when he discusses the benefit-related levy of jizyah (poll tax). However, as a general principle of equity, he advocates the ability-to-pay concept; indeed, on the basis of this concept he implies a highly progressive tax system. He even suggests that taxpayers should know the uses of their resources: “when they [rulers] demand revenue from the subjects, they must demand only at the proper seasons and times. Subjects must know the usages and burdens must be fixed in accordance with their capacity and ability to pay.” They [the rulers] must be “cruel-slayers, not sparing-blayers, at the hunt. That is, they must take little or nothing from the poor” (Conseil, 112).

(2) Public borrowing. Ghazali is among the few scholars of his era who discuss public borrowing as another source of revenue. He states: “One cannot deny permission to the ruler to borrow from the people when the needs of the state so warrant. However, the question is: if the ruler does not anticipate revenues in the public treasury which would exceed what is needed for the armies and other public officials, then on what basis can the funds be borrowed?” (Shiga, 240). Thus it appears that given the conditions of the economy, Ghazali would permit public borrowing if it is possible to ensure repayment from future revenues. In present-day usage such borrowing is exemplified by “revenue bonds,” extensively used by state and local governments in the United States.

(3) Public expenditures. As with sources of revenue prevalence at the time, Ghazali is also critical of the manner and areas of public expenditure: “At this time the rulers do not reward the deserving people, but those who they think could be useful in safeguarding their own interest, who make their courts decorated and who could be used to praise them and give them compliments in their presence as well as absence” (Al-Muhtad, 2:177). The functional delineation of public expenditures that Ghazali recommends is rather broad and flexible: establishment of socioeconomic justice, security and stability of the state, and development of a prosperous society—almost in the order mentioned (Conseil, 56, 78, 81).

In addition to what has already been noted about ensuring such conditions, it might be said that though Ghazali prefers voluntary sharing as a means of preventing societal injustice, he would allow state intervention as an option, if necessary, to eliminate poverty and widespread distress:

When the sultan’s subjects fall into penury or suffer distress, it is the duty of the ruler, especially in times of drought or when there are inexcusable failures of harvest (on account of higher prices). The king must [then] provide the subjects with food and extend assistance and ensure that his officials do not oppress people—for, if that happens, people would become impoverished and leave the territory. Then revenue flow would be shattered; profits would accrue to hoarders and the Sultan would [earn] curses and a bad name. It was for this reason that the rulers in the past practiced utmost frugality in such situations, and thus aided the deserving subjects” (Conseil, 101–2).

Clearly, Ghazali is linking people’s impoverishment, aggravated by deficient public services, to their migration, leading to a general economic decline, reduced tax base, and further deterioration, and the potential emergence of preachers who exploit the poor.

As for general development of the society, Ghazali points out the need for building socioeconomic infrastructure. He says that public resources “should be spent on the construction of bridges, religious structures (mosques), shelters, roads, and other similar activities whose benefits are shared by people generally” (Al-Muhtad, 2:130). He seems aware of the “positive consumption” and “spillover aspects of public goods. Elsewhere he suggests that public spending may be incurred for functions such as education, general law and order (public administration), defense, and health care (Al-Muhtad, 2:140).

Ghazali insists on honesty and efficiency in the affairs of the public sector. He views the public treasury as a trust in the hands of the rulers, who must not be extravagant. As for a secure and stable social environment, he declares: “Whenever sultans [rulers] rule oppressively, injustice appears; and however much prosperity there may be, this will not suit the subjects if accompanied by insecurity. However, little prosperity there may be, this will not displeasure them if accompanied by security; on the contrary, it will suit them...now the security of the society depends upon the discipline maintained by the Sultan” (Conseil, 76).
Writing several centuries before the well-known European classical economists, Ghazzali was the product of an era when man, not matter, was the measure of all things and economic concerns were relatively secondary—the ultimate test of all human activities being one's salvation. Such were the underlying assumptions of Arab scholastics generally, and, indeed, of their European counterparts. Thus Ghazzali is very much in company with such European scholastics as Aquinas (1225–1274) and Albertus Magnus (c. 1270), whose writings, as influenced by the Arab scholars, also extended to all facets of the human condition.

Ghazzali defines a divinely ordained social welfare function, based upon rather specific social objectives, as well as guidelines for prioritizing individual and social needs (necessities, comforts, and luxuries), interpreted broadly to include material and nonmaterial aspects of life.

More specifically, his scholarship reveals a deep understanding of the voluntary, market-oriented exchange that “naturally” evolves among freely acting individuals, motivated by self-interest and mutual necessity. Such an environment is guided by a divinely inspired code of ethics and moral values. Further, while warning against worldly evils, Ghazzali clearly acknowledges—and mandates—the need for economic pursuits both private and public. In fact, he accords such activities an aura of piety and nobility by his constant reminder as to their religious validity—a “calling.”

In discussing production behavior, Ghazzali posits a tripartite hierarchy of industries—also part of man’s socially obligatory duties in addition to individual, materialistic motivations. This scheme complements his social-welfare function. He also recognizes stages and linkages in production. He discusses the efficiency costs of specialization and division of labor, but he is also aware of the social problems that can arise from excessive specialization. Thus he emphasizes a major role for the spirit of cooperation in production.

The evolution of a monetary economy from a simple barter system has been a subject of enduring interest among economists. It is fair to state that almost no other scholar up to his time had provided as sophisticated an exposition of this topic as did Ghazzali. Certainly, in terms of its broad conceptual and analytical construct, it is remarkably similar to what one finds in any present-day textbook. He provides a lucid exposition of how the problems of barter are mitigated by money. Like European scholastics and other Arab scholars, he condemns usury and money hoarding, both of which he deems mean and money hoarding, both of which sustain money to deviate from its key function. He also discusses the problems of counterfeiting and debasement of money; he condemns both. Indeed, he develops an early version of what later became known as Gresham’s law.

Ghazzali wrote a special treatise on the role of the state and functions of the ruler. In this volume and elsewhere he discusses public finances, including taxes, borrowing, and public expenditures. Though many of his contemporaries wrote on this subject, his discourse is especially coherent. He distinguishes between religious and “extra-religious” revenue, and he is critical of the prevalent “extrareligious” levies. Further, he allows for additional taxes, as dictated by the spirit of maslahah or social welfare. He advocates the well-known “ability-to-pay” principle of tax justice and is also aware of the “benefit-received” concept. He is also concerned with tax administration issues and critiques the malpractices of rulers and tax-collectors.

With respect to public expenditures, Ghazzali identifies various functional needs, not simply in terms of maslahah, but from the standpoint of promoting society’s economic development and prosperity (to the extent that he recognizes the need for socioeconomic infrastructure). And he is aware of the need for efficiency in the use of public funds, as they are a “public trust.” And given his hierarchy of society’s needs, we could say that Ghazzali suggests methods of “prioritizing” the use of public funds.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that perhaps more than any other Arab scholar of the era, Ghazzali achieved a clear understanding of the operation of a voluntary-exchange economic system, albeit within the larger theological framework which viewed all human behavior in teleological terms. He left behind a rich legacy of economic thought upon which, through translation and translation, much more could be built by his successors. His influence on European intellectual developments is widely acknowledged, “Europe as well as the Muslim East felt the impact of Al-Ghazali’s teaching. Echoes of his voice are heard in the reflections of Maimonides, and his work was paralleled by Thomas Aquinas in the discourse on Christian doctrine and in other portions of the Summa Theologica” (Cotter’s Encyclopaedia, 1779, 13:312-13).

Such “parallelism” (the field of economics included) becomes obvious from a rather cursory comparison of Aquinas’s works with those of Ghazzali. To the discredit of Schumpeter’s “great gap” revision, substantial evidence points to Ghazzali’s great impact on European scholastics, especially Aquinas. His “teaching is quoted by St. Thomas and other scholastic writers” (O’Leary, 2001; and it is generally known that Aquinas was deeply influenced by Muslim philosophers, chiefly al-Ghazzali” (Sartre, 1911; see also Copland, 1981; Myers, 1942; Reisch, 156; Shanks, 189). It has been suggested that Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, the chief source of “Thomistic economics,” was “an attempt to harmonize Christianity with Aristotelian philosophy” (Newman, 199). It
Ghazanfar and Ishāq

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali


